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I. INTRODUCTION
Following news of allegations that a Ropes & Gray, LLP,
associate engaged in insider trading, the law firm stated, "'We are
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deeply disappointed about this situation, which suggests an
extreme breach of this person's duty of trust to our clients and to
the firm."" A blog called the Anonymous Lawyer quoted the
firm's statement and followed it with this fictional account:
Well, no kidding. It's damn well a breach of the duty of trust to
the firm. If an associate here found out some insider information we
could use to make a killing, they better not be keeping it to
themselves. They ought to tell a partner, tell the whole executive
committee, give us all a chance to get in on it. If we can't trust our
associates to bring us valuable opportunities to increase our own
personal wealth, what do we really need them around for? I've
spent years digging through client paperwork looking for
information that I could use to make better investment decisions.
And for an associate-not even a partner-for an associate to be
running with this, without making the opportunity available to his
superiors.... Well, it was a pretty easy decision to fire him. And it
should serve as a warning to everyone else at the firm-you find a
good deal,
you bring it up the chain of command and let us all have
2
a piece.

As indicated by the actual statement from Ropes & Gray, LLP,
firm leaders condemn associates who breach fiduciary duties to the
firm, as well as to firm clients.' At the same time, the fictional
blog post reflects the cynicism of commentators and associates
who readily criticize and satirize the conduct and pronouncements
of partners, especially leaders of large law firms. 4 Popular
websites regularly include information and comments from
disgruntled associates who question firm decisions and the manner
in which firm principals treat associates and other employees. 5
The steady stream of leaks of firm information has led some
firm leaders to dissuade employees from disseminating information that the firm views as confidential. One firm's efforts to do
so captured the attention of bloggers. In October 2009 the hightraffic blog Above the Law (ATL) excoriated a memorandum
issued by the Washington, D.C.-based firm WilmerHale. 6 When
1. Anonymous Lawyer, http://anonymouslawyer.blogspot.com (Nov. 5, 2009, 9:22
EST).

2. Id.
3. Id.

4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Posting of David Lat & Elie Mystal to Above the Law, WilmerHale Warns
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news of the memorandum first appeared on ATL, the comments
on a discussion thread portrayed the memorandum as very
draconian.7 The following epitomizes the comments that decried
the firm's effort to silence its associates:
The firm has made it abundantly clear that no one should provide
tips to ATL or post comments. The clear message is that if caught,
you'll be fired. I, however, have already been "transitioned out[,"]
so I have nothing to worry about other than feeding my family.
Didn't you just love the scathing internal memo meant to scare the
living &*A$ out of those who were even thinking about tipping
ATL? Apparently it worked, because [the firm memorandum]
didn't end up here (though it should have). I guess the8 few that
were spared from the bloodbath are shaking in their boots.
A firm spokesperson confirmed the firm had distributed a
memorandum: "From time to time leaders of the firm
communicate to employees that we have an obligation to protect
the confidentiality of firm business and matters. This is nothing
more than a general reminder of our obligation." 9
The ATL piece questioned whether the memorandum was a
simple reminder about attorney-client privilege or a scare tactic
that could be viewed as heavy-handed and Kremlinesque. 1° By
the end of the month, a follow-up ATL post revisited the issue
after ATL obtained an actual copy of the WilmerHale
memorandum. The ATL piece acknowledged the memorandum
was a "little disappointing" and "not nearly as scary as [they] were
led to believe." 1 1 Following cautionary words to firms that
attempted to clamp down on leaks, the ATL post printed the
Associates Against Talking to ATL-But Has It Worked?, http://abovethelaw.com
(Oct. 13,
/2009/10/wilmerhale-warns-associates-against-talking-to-atl-but-has-it-worked?
2009, 17:40 EST).
7. A general theme throughout the comments concerns the intent of the
memorandum to chill open discussion of matters. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. See id. (questioning why the lawyers at WilmerHale and certain other firms,
"strive so mightily to keep people in the dark about what's going on in their workplaces").
11. Posting of David Lat to Above the Law, Congratulations to WilmerHale on a
Major Pro Bono Win (Plus the WilmerHale Warning, and Thoughts on Law Firms Trying
to Crack Down on Leaks.), http://abovethelaw.com/2009/10/congratulations-towilmerhale-on-a-major-pro-bono-winplus-the-wilmerhale-waring-and-thoughts-on-lawfirms-trying-to-crack-down-on-leaks (Oct. 30, 2009, 16:14 EST).

ST. MARY'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 41:595

memorandum. The WilmerHale memorandum first discussed firm
efforts to keep associates informed, stating that notes of internal
firm meetings were improperly funneled to the outside media.
The memorandum ended with the following:
We continue to believe that we must and should communicate
broadly with the firm community. And, we will. We also recognize
that, with near unanimity, you each have respected our commitment
to the confidentiality of firm business and matters. This recent
event, however, leads us to reiterate what almost everyone knows.
We each have an obligation to the institution of WilmerHale, and
we each have an obligation to protect the confidentiality of
this is true has been obvious to
information provided to us. That
12
many. We hope it will be for all.
This memorandum and the controversy surrounding it raises
questions related to associates' duties to their firms and their
perceptions of those duties. Specifically, to what extent do
associates owe fiduciary duties to their firms? Do they generally
recognize and fulfill those duties? Surprisingly, few authors have
tackled this topic in the last twenty years. 13 To fill the gap, this
Article addresses these issues. Part II introduces the topic by
examining the status of associates. Part III applies agency
principles to the firm-associate relationship, examines specific
duties, and discusses cases involving alleged breaches of duty by
associates. The conclusion considers associate duties in the
current legal, organizational, and socio-technological environment
12. Id.
13. In 1985, Professor Leonard Gross wrote the seminal article on associates and
their fiduciary duties, which included empirical data from a survey of 201 associates in
Illinois firms. Leonard Gross, Ethical Problemsof Law Firm Associates, 26 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 259 (1985) (reporting on such issues as fiduciary duties between associates and
firms); see also Cindy Holland, Comment, The Liabilities and Ethical Responsibilities of a
Law Firm Associate, 16 J. LEGAL PROF. 241 (1991) (examining the roles of law firm
partners and associates). In 1988, Professor Vincent R. Johnson authored an article
concentrating on liability concerns that arise when departing partners and associates solicit
law firm clients. Vincent R. Johnson, Solicitation of Law Firm Clients by Departing
Partnersand Associates: Tort, Fiduciary,and DisciplinaryLiability, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 1
(1988). Other articles focused on ethics concerns of supervised lawyers. See, e.g., Irwin D.
Miller, Preventing Misconduct by Promoting the Ethics of Attorneys' Supervisory Duties,
70 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 259 (1994) (highlighting the need for the prevention of attorney
misconduct through self-regulation). Most recently, Douglas R. Richmond, a legal
malpractice and ethics expert, published a thoughtful article that focused more on ethics
than fiduciary duty issues. Douglas R. Richmond, Professional Responsibilities of Law
Firm Associates, 45 BRANDEIS L.J. 199 (2007).
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in which associates practice. The Article closes with observations
on the importance of firm partners considering the effect of firm
culture on associate attitudes and conduct.
II.

STATUS OF ASSOCIATES

Over the last twenty years, the structure and composition of law
firms have radically changed.1 4 In 1991, Professors Marc Galanter
and Thomas Palay used the tournament theory to analyze the
economics and dynamics of law firms. 15 At the time, their model
focused on two classes of lawyers: partners and associates. 16 The
associates who successfully competed in the tournament acquired
the trophy of partnership status.1 7 Associates who did not "make
partner" tended to leave the firm. 18 Economic and organizational
changes have changed the tournament. Now, lawyers in law firms
fall into an array of categories, including non-equity partners,
permanent (staff) associates, and "of counsel" lawyers. 19 To
account for this new set of players, Professors Galanter and
William Henderson suggest a more complex and elongated
tournament that applies to both partners and associates.2 ° In
discussing the fiduciary duties, this Article uses the term
"associates" to refer to the lawyers on the partnership track as well
as other associates who are commonly called permanent or staff
associates.21
14. MARC GALANTER & THOMAS PALAY, TOURNAMENT
TRANSFORMATION OF THE BIG LAW FIRM 3 (1991).

OF LAWYERS: THE

15. Id.

16. Id.
17. Id. at 101.
18. Id.
19. MARC GALANTER & THOMAS PALAY, TOURNAMENT
TRANSFORMATION OF THE BIG LAW FIRM 58 (1991).

OF LAWYERS:

THE

20. See Marc Galanter & William Henderson, The Elastic Tournament: A Second
Transformation of the Big Law Firm, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1867, 1877 (2008) (advancing a

core-mantle model of the "firm in which a core of owner-partners is surrounded by a
much larger mantle of employed lawyers that includes [associates on the partnership
track], non-equity partners, permanent associates, of-counsel and de-equitized former
partners").
21. This Article does not discuss the duties of "of counsel" lawyers largely because
their status, rights, and responsibilities vary from firm to firm. Many firms use the term to
designate and recognize a senior lawyer who is not an equity holder. Firms also use the
term to refer to retired or part-time lawyers. Depending on the circumstances, "of
counsel" lawyers may be employees or independent contractors. The lawyer's relationship
to the firm and communications with third parties will affect the lawyer's duty to the firm
and the firm's liability for the acts and omissions of the "of counsel" lawyer.
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Generally speaking, the term "associate" refers to a "salaried
lawyer-employee who is not a partner of the firm." 22 Typically,
the law firm pays the associate's overhead, although the salary may
be based on a formula that accounts for an overhead calculation.23
Another distinguishing feature is that the law firm, as an employer,
'
"has the right to control the associate in the law firm's business. "24
This control includes assigning and monitoring work performed by
the associate.2 5
Given the associate's employment status and the supervisor's
right to control the associate's work, an associate functions as an
agent of the law firm. 26 The Restatement (Third) of Agency
defines an "agency" as "the fiduciary relationship that arises when
one person (a 'principal') manifests assent to another person (an
'agent') that the agent shall act on the principal's behalf and
subject to the principal's control, and the agent manifests assent or
27
otherwise consents so to act."
The associate is an agent of the law firm, supervising lawyers,
and clients. 28 Agency law also treats an associate as a "subagent," a particular type of agent who is subject to more of the

22. Fla. Bar v. Fetterman, 439 So. 2d 835, 838 (Fla. 1983).
23. Leonard Gross, Ethical Problems of Law Firm Associates, 26 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 259,260 (1985).
24. Id. (citing the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 2(2) (1958)).
25. See id. at 260-61 ("IT]he associate's superior ... can direct the associate

regarding the type of work that should be done, how it should be done, and when it should
be done.").
26. See generally Hilliard v. Riverside Methodist Hosp., No. 95APE04-473, 1996 WL
17578, at *4 (Ohio App. 10th Jan. 16, 1996) (referring to the agent-principal relationship
between a law firm and an associate). In Hilliard,the court declined to rule that a law firm
associate is a "fiduciary to the firm as a matter of law." Id. According to the court, the
existence of an agency relationship should not turn on job title, but the "realities of each
situation." Id.
27. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (2006). According to the reporter's

notes, the "black letter for this section is consistent with the substance of the definition in
Restatement Second, Agency § 1, except for the introduction of 'assent,' ... [and changes]
to reflect contemporary usage."

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 reporter's

note a (2006).
28. See Cindy Holland, Comment, The Liabilities and Ethical Responsibilities of a
Law Firm Associate, 16 J. LEGAL PROF. 241, 242 (1991) (maintaining that under the
Restatement Second of Agency, the associate may be a "sub-agent" because the partner is
both an agent of the firm and the client). This Article does not analyze fiduciary duties
that lawyers owe clients. For a recent discussion of lawyers' fiduciary duties to clients and
reconciling the law of agency and the law governing lawyers, see Sande Buhai, Lawyers As
Fiduciaries,53 ST. Louis U. L.J. 553 (2009).
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principal's control than a nonservant. 2 9 As both agents and subagents, associates owe fiduciary obligations to their firms,
''consistent with those that servants and agents traditionally have
owed to principals." 30
III. ASSOCIATE'S FIDUCIARY DUTIES
Applying the Restatement (Third) of Agency, an associate as an
agent owes a fiduciary duty to act loyally for the firm's benefit in
all matters connected with the agency relationship. 3 1 This overarching standard of loyalty unifies more-specific rules of loyalty.3 2
The more-specific rules impose a duty on agents not to receive a
material benefit from a third party at the principal's expense 3 3 and
prohibit the agent from acting as or on behalf of an adverse
party.3 4 Another specific loyalty rule prohibits agents from
competing with their principals .3 The last loyalty section under
the Restatement (Third) of Agency states that an agent has a duty
not to use property of the principal for the agent's own purposes
or those of a third party.36 This same section recognizes the
agent's duty to not use or communicate confidential information of
the principal for the agent's own purposes or those of a third
29. Leonard Gross, Ethical Problems of Law Firm Associates, 26 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 259,261 (1985) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 2 (1958)).
30. Id. at 262 (citing H. REUSCHLEIN & W. GREGORY, AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP
§§ 65-69 (1979)).
31. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01 (2006). Some courts have declined
to treat associates as fiduciaries of their firms. For a discussion of the split, see William
Jordan, Law Firm May Not Bring Breach of Fiduciary Duty Claim Against Associate for
Disclosing ConfidentialInformation, 32 PROF. LIAB. REP. 256, 256-57 (2007).
32. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01 cmt. b (2006).
33. See id. § 8.02 ("An agent has a duty not to acquire a material benefit from a third
party in connection with transactions conducted or other actions taken on behalf of the
principal or otherwise through the agent's use of the agent's position.").
34. Restatement (Third) of Agency clarifies that an "agent has a duty not to deal
with the principal as or on behalf of an adverse party in a transaction connected with the
agency relationship." Id. § 8.03.
35. The Restatement (Third) of Agency describes this duty not to compete as
follows:
Throughout the duration of an agency relationship, an agent has a duty to refrain
from competing with the principal and from taking action on behalf of or otherwise
assisting the principal's competitors. During that time, an agent may take action, not
otherwise wrongful, to prepare for competition following termination of the agency
relationship.
Id. § 8.04.
36. Id. § 8.05.
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party.37 In addition to the loyalty duties described above, the
Restatement imposes other duties upon agents, including the
duties of care, competence, and diligence. 3 8 Agents also owe their
principals duties of obedience 3 9 and good conduct. 40

The

following section examines these duties, focusing on the duty of
loyalty owed by an associate as an agent of the principal, the
employer-firm.
A. Duties of Care, Competence, and Diligence
Assuming the facts support the existence of a fiduciary
relationship between the associate and the firm, the associate owes
the firm a duty to exercise reasonable care and handle firm
business in a diligent, competent, and professional manner.
Arguably this duty includes practicing law in accordance with
applicable ethical rules of professional conduct. Applying agency
law to the firm-associate relationship, Professor Leonard Gross
describes the duty of good care as follows:
An agent impliedly warrants to his principal that he possesses the
requisite skill and experience ordinarily required to perform the
service. He also promises to exercise reasonable care, skill, and
diligence in serving the principal. The law firm associate, as a
servant of the firm, warrants to the law firm that he possesses and

will exercise the skill of the ordinary attorney. An attorney with a
particular speciality, such as a patent attorney, warrants to the law

firm employing him that he will practice his specialty with the
knowledge and skill of an ordinary attorney in his specialty. If the
associate is negligent, his employer, the law firm, will be liable to the
client who is injured by the associate's negligence. If the law firm is

liable to the client because of the associate's negligence, the firm
may obtain indemnity from the associate for its loss.41
Understanding their liability for injuries caused by the acts and
omissions of firm lawyers, law firms obtain legal malpractice
insurance that provides coverage for work performed in the course
of firm employment.4 2 Therefore, few cases arise where firms
37. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.05 (2006).
38. Id. § 8.08.
39. Id. § 8.09.
40. Id. § 8.10.
41. Leonard Gross, Ethical Problems of Law Firm Associates, 26 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 259, 262-63 (1985) (internal citations omitted).
42. A typical legal malpractice policy will define "insured" to include lawyers who
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pursue claims against associates who fail to practice with
reasonable care, diligence, or competence.4 3
In order for a firm to recover on a breach of fiduciary duty
claim, it would have to establish damages caused by the breach. If
the loss is covered by legal malpractice insurance, possible damage
to the firm would be the out-of-pocket and deductible amounts
that the firm paid. Firms would be hard-pressed to pursue such a
claim against an associate. For example, a plaintiff's firm recently
agreed to pay $1.5 million to settle claims by two former clients
alleging that an associate failed to exercise diligence on their
behalf.4 4

Firm managers would not be inclined to sue the ex-

associate if litigation would reflect poorly on supervising lawyers
who had a duty to monitor associates. Even if the firm could
establish a breach of fiduciary duty and damages, a judgment
against an associate-defendant may be uncollectable.4 5
A different type of damage occurs if a firm loses fees because of
an associate's lack of care and diligence. In one such case, the law
firm sued an associate the firm hired to work on the firm's
litigation files.4 6
Contending the firm sustained damages,
including the loss of fees, the firm asserted breach of fiduciary
duty, fraud, and unjust enrichment claims. 47 The court rejected
the breach of fiduciary duty claim, concluding that hiring an
associate to run a department at the law firm did not establish a
fiduciary relationship characterized by "overmastering influence"
perform work on behalf of the named insured, the law firm. RONALD E. MALLEN &
JEFFREY M. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 36:7 (2010 ed.) (explaining that the term
"insureds" or "additional insureds" is used to refer to persons "who are afforded the
benefits of coverage[] because of their relationship to the named insureds"). For an
analysis of lawyer mobility and the changing definition of "insureds" under legal
malpractice policies, see Susan Saab Fortney, Insurance Issues Related to Lateral Hire
Musical Chairs,PROF. LAW., June 2000, at 65.
43. For a discussion of cases in which firms sued associates and the justification for
allowing such cases to go forward, see Kramer v. Nowak, 908 F. Supp. 1281, 1289-92 (E.D.
Pa. 1995). In applying New Jersey law and generally applicable principles of agency, the
court concluded that supervising lawyers may sue subordinate lawyers for their negligence
in representing clients. Id. at 1292.
44. Martha Neil, Law Firm to Pay $1.5M to Settle Claims That Ex-Associate Dropped
Cases, A.B.A. J., Oct. 19, 2009, http:llwww.abajournal.comlnewslarticlelawfi
rm to-pay-l.5m to-settleclaimsthatex-associatedroppedcases.
45. For example, the former associate (whose conduct resulted in the $1.5 million
settlement) left law practice to run a ski resort. Id.
46. Edelstein & Diamond, L.L.P. v. Orloff, No. 1310 Jan. Term 2004, Control 120187,
2005 WL 1648191, at *1 (Pa. Com. P1. June 29, 2005).
47. Id.
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on one side and "weakness, dependence, or trust, justifiably
reposed" on the other.48 These cases and others against associates
reflect courts' unwillingness to allow law firms to pursue actions
simply by cloaking conduct as a breach of fiduciary duty by
employed lawyers.
B. Duties of Obedience and Good Conduct
An associate, as a firm employee, is generally obligated to
follow firm policies and procedures. As a supervised person, the
associate is obligated to obey all reasonable instructions of the law
firm regarding the manner in which the associate practices law. 4 9
For an associate practicing law, professional obligations under
applicable ethics rules temper this duty of obedience. The
American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct
(Model Rules) and disciplinary rules based on the Model Rules
require that a supervised lawyer abide by the applicable rules of
conduct and not simply follow instructions of a supervising lawyer
if the subordinate knows that the conduct is unethical.5 ° If the
ethics question is debatable, the Model Rules allow the supervised
lawyer to follow the supervising lawyer's orders. 51 For example,
an associate is subject to discipline if the associate follows
instructions to shred documents clearly covered by a discovery
request. On the other hand, the disciplinary rules allow the
associate to follow the supervisor's instructions to withhold a
document if it is questionable as to whether the discovery request
actually covers the subject document.
Various commentators have analyzed the Model Rules'
approach to reconciling the duties of the associate to both follow
instructions and comply with the ethics rules.52 Others have
48. Id. at *2 (citation omitted).
49. Leonard Gross, Ethical Problems of Law Firm Associates, 26 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 259, 266 (1985) (explaining that an associate, as a servant of the law firm, owes a duty
of obedience to the law firm and each partner).
50. Model Rule of Professional Conduct 5.2(a) explains that a supervised lawyer is
bound by applicable ethics rules notwithstanding the fact that the lawyer is supervised by
another lawyer. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.2(a) (2009).
51. Model Rule of Professional Conduct 5.2(b) allows associates to follow
instructions given by supervisors when the ethics question is arguable and the supervisor's
direction and proposed course of action is reasonable. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 5.2(b) (2009).
52. See generally Andrew M. Perlman, Unethical Obedience by Subordinate
Attorneys: Lessons from Social Psychology, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 451 (2007) (explaining
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tackled the ethical dilemma for an associate who is threatened or
actually terminated for failing to follow instructions that the
These commentators
associate believed to be unethical.5 3
derives from
the
associate's
conundrum
recognize
that
generally
the conflicting duties as an agent: duties to the principalsupervising lawyer, duties to clients, and duties to the legal system
to follow the dictates of professional rules of conduct.54
An associate owes the employer a duty of good conduct.
Although "good conduct" may be in the eye of the beholder,
conduct that reflects poorly on an individual lawyer and the
lawyer's employer may breach the associate's duty to the firm and
provide a basis for termination.55 For example, an associate fails
to fulfill this duty of "good conduct" if the associate engages in
illegal conduct, such as insider trading or prostitution.56 Some
crimes involving moral turpitude may no longer be the basis for
professional discipline if the conduct does not reflect adversely on
the lawyer's fitness to practice law. 57 Nevertheless, a law firm may
an associate's conformity with the instructions of a superior from a social psychology
perspective); Carol M. Rice, The Superior Orders Defense in Legal Ethics: Sending the
Wrong Message to Young Lawyers, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 887 (1997) (arguing that
Rule 5.2(b) should be repealed).
53. E.g., Kenneth J. Wilbur, Wrongful Discharge of Attorneys: A Cause of Action to
FurtherProfessional Responsibility, 92 DICK. L. REV. 777, 778-79 (1988) (proposing that
attorneys should be protected providing they reasonably interpret the rule). Courts are
split on the issue of whether an associate can maintain an action for wrongful discharge
based on blowing the whistle on unethical conduct. See Alex B. Long, Whistleblowing
Attorneys and Ethical Infrastructures,68 MD. L. REV. 786, 796-97 (2009) (discussing the
unpredictability of whistleblower claims).
54. For practical recommendations for associates who have been instructed to engage
in unethical behavior, see Douglas R. Richmond, Professional Responsibilities of Law
Firm Associates, 45 BRANDEIS L.J. 199,205-06 (2007).
55. Darryl Van Duch, An Associate's Slide from Megafirm to Prostitution,NAT'L L.J.,
Mar. 24, 1997, at A7.
56. In 1997, bar regulators filed a disciplinary complaint against a former Winston &
Strawn lawyer who entered a guilty plea to a misdemeanor prostitution charge. Id. The
Illinois regulator alleged that the associate engaged in an activity that "tends to bring the
legal profession into disrepute." Id. The associate left the law firm eight months before
her arrest for prostitution. Id. If the associate had engaged in prostitution while
employed at the firm, would that conduct constitute a breach of her fiduciary duty of
"good conduct," even though the prostitution did not relate to the practice of law? By
contrast, insider trading relates to the practice of law and the expectation that lawyers
should not misuse confidential information.
57. Unlike the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct do not treat all crimes as "misconduct" for the purpose of
professional discipline. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4 cmt. 2 (2009)
(noting that some criminal offenses, such as those involving personal morality, have "no
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maintain that such conduct justifies terminating the associate
because the publicity surrounding such a crime affects the firm's
reputation and client relations. Beyond termination, it is unlikely
that a firm would pursue a breach of fiduciary claim against an
associate unless the firm would be able to establish collectable
damages.
C. Duty of Loyalty
The general fiduciary duty of loyalty "requires that the agent
subordinate the agent's interests to those of the principal and place
the principal's interests first as to matters connected with the
agency relationship." 58 As applied to associates, this principle
generally requires that the associate "act for the firm's benefit
rather than for" the associate's "own benefit or for the benefit of
another party whose interests are adverse to those of the firm." 5 9
An associate may violate this general duty of loyalty and the
more specific duties of loyalty when an associate moonlights
without the firm's permission. Moonlighting may take different
forms. For example, an associate might provide legal services to
persons who have no connection to the law firm that employs the
associate. Depending on the circumstances, this conduct could
violate the associate's duty of loyalty to the firm. For example, an
associate may be liable for breach of fiduciary duty if the associate
diverted the business from the firm or used law firm resources in
representing persons who are not clients of the firm.6 0 Recently, a
West Virginia-based firm brought such a claim, alleging that a

specific connection to fitness for the practice of law").
58. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01 cmt. b (2006).
59. Leonard Gross, Ethical Problems of Law Firm Associates, 26 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 259,264 (1985).
60. For an interesting case involving moonlighting by an associate and imposition of
restrictions in the associate's employment agreement, see Charleston, S.C. Registry for
Golf & Tourism, Inc. v. Young Clement Rivers & Tisdale, LLP, 598 S.E.2d 717, 719 (S.C.
Ct. App. 2004). In that case, the firm escaped liability for the conduct of an associate who,
without authorization, performed legal services for an entity. In this representation, the
associate allegedly misappropriated funds and committed professional malpractice. The
firm's letter of agreement with the associate stated that the firm was employing the
associate's "total and best professional efforts." Id. The firm also imposed "strict
procedures for keeping track of all the professional activities" of the associates. Id. at 720.
The firm's efforts in monitoring the associate's conduct evidently helped it successfully
defend against the vicarious liability claims because the client was unable to offer evidence
that the associate had apparent authority for work performed. Id. at 722.
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former associate, when employed by the firm, collected attorneys'
fees from firm clients. 6 1 To deter associates from diverting
business or moonlighting, firms may adopt policies forbidding
associates from practicing law for their own accounts.
Unauthorized representation of firm clients might also
constitute a breach of fiduciary duty. In Prince, Yeates &
Geldzahler v. Young,6 2 a law firm asserted a breach of fiduciary
duty claim against a former associate who "represented certain
clients ... without disclosing the representation to the firm while
simultaneously using firm resources[,] filing pleadings in the firm's
name in connection with [the] matters," and retaining fees derived
from the representation. 6 3 The Supreme Court of Utah concluded
that the district court erred in denying the law firm's motion for
summary judgment on the breach of fiduciary duty claim.6 4 In
reaching that conclusion, the court declined to opine on whether
"all 'mere employee[s]' owe fiduciary duties to their employers to
65
not compete with the employer's legitimate business interests."
Rather, the court recognized a fiduciary duty that arises due to the
nature of the relationship between a lawyer and the employerfirm. 6 6 As stated by the court:
In the relationship of a lawyer and his or her employer, there does
exist a duty of honest and ethical behavior. Because of the privilege
granted to engage in the practice of law, we impose upon members
of our bar a fiduciary duty that encompasses the obligation to not
compete with their employer, which we define as any law firm or
legal services provider who may employ them in a legal capacity,
without the employer's prior knowledge and agreement. 6 7
The court explained that "[t]o hold otherwise would imply that
attorneys are free to join law firms, derive benefits from that
association, and essentially operate as sole practitioners while
61. Martha Neil, Associate Collected Law Firm's Legal Fees, Suit Says, A.B.A. J.,
Nov. 11, 2009, http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/associate-collected-law-firmsle

gal-feessuitsays.
62. Prince, Yeates & Geldzahler v. Young, 94 P.3d 179 (Utah 2004).

63. Id. at 182.
64. Id. at 185.
65. Id. at 185 n.2.
66. Id. at 185.
67. Prince, 94 P.3d at 185. The court also held that the appropriate remedy for the
breach would be disgorgement of the fees charged and collected by the associate while
employed at the firm. Id. at 186.
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simultaneously receiving a salary and using firm resources for their
independent legal activities."-6 8 As recognized by the Supreme
Court of Utah in Prince, the nature of the law practice affects the
analysis of the fiduciary duty of associates.
Similarly, in the case of Johnson v. Brewer & Pritchard,P.C. ,69
the Texas Supreme Court considered the nature of law practice
and legal ethics principles in evaluating a breach of fiduciary duty
claim against a former associate who referred a large personal
injury case to another firm, rather than referring the matter to the
associate's own employer-firm.7" In evaluating the firm's claims
against the associate, the court examined the complexities involved
in imposing an absolute duty of loyalty on employees, especially
when the employee is a lawyer who owes ethical and fiduciary
duties to clients. The court explained that the "employer's right to
demand and receive loyalty must be tempered by society's
legitimate interest in encouraging competition."'7 1 Given lawyers'
ethical obligations to provide competent representation, the Texas
Supreme Court rejected an "absolute fiduciary duty upon
associates of a law firm to abstain from directing [prospective
clients] to a firm other than the associate's employer." 7 2 Rather,
the court imposed a narrower duty, holding that associates owe "a
fiduciary duty to [their] employer[s] not to personally profit or
realize any financial or other gain or advantage from referring a
matter to another law firm or lawyer, absent the employer's
agreement otherwise."7 3 In balancing interests, the court stated,
"A firm's legitimate interest in demanding loyalty from its
associates should not outweigh competing considerations of the
public's interest in encouraging lawyers to assist those who need
legal advice in securing the most appropriate representation for
the particular type of case and market competition." 74
Societal and client concerns related to competition and access to
68. Id. at 185 (noting that the associate was an at-will employee who could leave at
any time and, presumably, clients could follow him).
69. Johnson v. Brewer & Pritchard, P.C., 73 S.W.3d 193 (Tex. 2002).
70. Id. at 193.
71. Id. at 201 (citing Augat, Inc. v. Aegis, Inc., 565 N.E.2d 415 (Mass. 1991)).
72. Id. at 202 (illustrating why the lawyer's ethical duty to provide competent
representation may lead a lawyer to refer a case to another law firm rather than the
employer-firm).
73. Id. at 197.
74. Johnson, 73 S.W.3d at 203.
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legal services are also weighed in cases in which firms allege
breach of fiduciary duty by associates who solicited firm clients.
These claims appear in various reported cases involving breach of
fiduciary duty claims against associates and fall into two
categories. The first category of cases involves breach of loyalty
claims against associates who solicited firm clients at a time the
associates were employed by their firms. The second category of
claims involves claims for conduct occurring after termination of
the associate's employment at the firm.
Because lateral movement of lawyers is a daily reality, it is
important to consider an associate's liability exposure for conduct
arising before and after termination of employment.7 5 While
courts have provided some guidance, an examination of cases
reveals that the lines marking proper conduct are not perfectly
clear.1 6 77As noted by the court in Kopka, Landau & Pinkus v.
Hansen:
Prior to his termination, an employee must refrain from actively and
directly competing with his employer for customers and employees
and must continue to exert his best efforts on behalf of his employer.
But an employee may even make arrangements to compete, ...

except that he cannot properly use confidential information peculiar
to his employer's business, before he leaves his employ. [These
rules] balance the concern for the "integrity for the employment
relationship" against the privilege of employees to prepare to compete
employers without fear of breaching their fiduciary duty
against their
78
loyalty.
of

The court cited authority, including the Restatement (Third) of
Agency, for the proposition that the determination as to whether a
75. A developing body of law relates to lawyer mobility and issues related to lawyers
"grabbing" business. For a thorough discussion on the issues, see ROBERT W. HILLMAN,
HILLMAN ON LAWYER MOBILITY (2d ed. 1998 & Supp. 2008).
76. See Vincent R. Johnson, Solicitation of Law Firm Clients by Departing Partners
and Associates: Tort, Fiduciary,and DisciplinaryLiability, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 99 (1988)
(referring to the "jurisprudential uncertainty as to the nature of the fiduciary obligations"
that a departing lawyer owes her former colleagues). Professor Johnson identifies a
number of reasons why the issue of client solicitation is less likely to be addressed and
resolved through informal resolution when an associate leaves a firm, as compared to
when a partner leaves a firm. Id. at 15-16.
77. Kopka, Landau & Pinkus v. Hansen, 874 N.E.2d 1065 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).
78. Id. at 1070-71 (quoting Potts v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Employment Sec. Div.,
475 N.E.2d 708, 712 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985)). The law firm sued the associate after the
associate resigned from the firm and was joined by other associates and support staff.
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former employee's conduct was tortious is "extremely factsensitive."' 7 9 Based on the facts presented in the case, the court
concluded that the former associate's actions prior to termination
of the agency relationship amounted to preparation to compete
and thus did not contravene a duty to the principal-firm. 80 The
court upheld the summary judgment for the associate because
there was no evidence that the associate directly and actively
competed with the firm while still employed.8 1 This conclusion is
consistent with other court opinions that have recognized the
propriety of an associate preparing to depart from a firm.8 2
D. Disclosure and Use of ConfidentialInformation
As noted above, the duty of loyalty encompasses a duty to
refrain from self-dealing and disclosure of confidential
information. Confidentiality extends to client information covered
by the ethics rules and privileges. As agents of clients, lawyers
must preserve the confidentiality of information relating to the
fiduciary relationship with clients.8 3 As agents of their law firms
and partners, associates must also preserve information acquired
while the associate was employed by the firm. This may include
firm policies that are intended to be confidential, such as an
internal policy for screening "unworthy" clients.8 4
Associates have a duty not to use confidential firm information

79. Id. at 1071.
80. The associate's preparation to compete included questioning firm employees
about their desire to leave the firm and gathering information on their salary
requirements. Id.
81. Id. at 1072.
82. E.g., Wistow & Barylick, Inc. v. Bowen, No. Civ.A. PC 94-6341, 2002 WL
1803926, at *9 (R.I. Super. July 24, 2002) (concluding that the defendant-associate did not
breach a duty owed to the firm because the associate had a right as a matter of law to
prepare to depart from the firm without disclosure).
83. For more guidance on the confidentiality responsibilities of lawyers, see
RESTATEMENT OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS ch. 5 (2000).

Examples of improper

disclosure would be a litigator producing protected information without screening it and a
transactional lawyer recklessly forwarding to a journalist an e-mail that included
confidential information from a corporate client.
84. Presumably, such information would be confidential because firm leaders would
not want prospective clients to know the criteria that a firm uses for evaluating financial
worthiness and risks associated with potential representation. Cf. Leonard Gross, Ethical
Problemsof Law Firm Associates, 26 WM.& MARY L. REV. 259,265-66 (1985) (suggesting
that an associate would breach the duty of loyalty by disclosing confidential firm billing
policies).
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for personal gain. 5 This duty applies while the firm employs the
associate and extends after employment terminates. Although
restraints on competition by agents generally lapse with
termination of the agency relationship, Professor Robert Hillman,
the preeminent expert on lawyer mobility, points out that agency
law determines the extent to which information acquired during
the relationship may be used after termination of the
relationship.8 6 In evaluating firm claims against former associates
who allegedly used confidential firm information after leaving the
law firm, a number of opinions have noted the difficulty in
distinguishing between conduct amounting to a breach of fiduciary
duty and allowable pre-competitive activities. 87
Changes in law practice, technology, media, and electronic
communications have blurred lines between the handling of
disclosure and use of information when associates are working at a
firm, preparing to leave a firm, and utilizing information after
termination of employment at the firm. A high-profile case
against the prestigious New York-based firm of Sullivan &
Cromwell illustrates how dissemination of firm information takes
different twists when associates share information with traditional
newspapers and media outlets, as well as blogs and websites. The
case began in 2007 when Aaron Charney, while still employed by
Sullivan & Cromwell, filed a discrimination suit against the firm. s 8
Mr. Charney alleged discrimination based on his sexual orientation
85. This includes using information to usurp business opportunities and trading on
insider information. Recently, court documents filed in insider-trading cases in Ontario
and New York alleged that Gil Cornblum, a former Sullivan & Cromwell lawyer, sought
and shared confidential information about pending corporate deals. Martha Neil, Lawyer
Raided Sullivan & Cromwell Offices for Inside Info Years Ago, Court Filings Say, A.B.A.
J., Oct. 28, 2009, http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/lawyer raided-sullivancrom
welloffices for insideinfo-court filingssay. Mr. Cornblum committed suicide on the
eve of his scheduled plea. Id.
86. ROBERT W. HILLMAN, HILLMAN ON LAWYER MOBILITY § 3.2.1 (2d ed. 1998 &
Supp. 2008) (analyzing the different approaches used in the Restatement (Second) of
Agency and Restatement (Third) of Agency).
87. See Douglas R. Richmond, Yours, Mine, and Ours: Law Firm Property Disputes,
30 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 1, 25 (2009) (citing opinions in which the courts noted the difficulty
in drawing lines between permissible and impermissible conduct). "Distinctions are
especially difficult to draw where the clients involved were served by the departing
lawyers while still with the firm." Id. at 19.
88. For an account of the case, see Bruce Jackson & Debra G. Buster, Charney v.
Sullivan & Cromwell: What Lessons Lie Herefor Your Firm?, LAW J. NEWSLS., Nov. 2007,
http://www.agg.com/media/interior/publications/chamey-pub.short.pdf.
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and asserted that the firm had retaliated against him. The lawsuit
commenced when Mr. Charney, on a pro se basis, filed a twentythree-page complaint and published it on websites.89 The complaint named various individuals and referred to a "who's who" of
firm clients. 90
Mr. Charney also attached a copy of firm
documents to the complaint, including the law firm's partnership
agreement. 9 1 Thereafter, the firm placed Mr. Charney on paid
leave and filed a counter suit, alleging a number of claims,
including breach of the firm's confidentiality policy and breach of
fiduciary duty. 92 The firm pointed to the widely disseminated
complaint filed by Charney and alleged that he stole documents
from a partner's office and passed the documents to the Wall Street
Journal.93 The firm fired Charney after settlement talks failed. 94
In the course of litigation, the firm first succeeded in obtaining a
dismissal of Charney's original complaint. Although the court
determined that "Charney ... stated facts arguably sufficient to
support his claims, his complaint also contained extraneous and
prejudicial allegations that should [have been] excluded from an
amended complaint."' 95 Charney subsequently hired counsel, who
filed an amended complaint, and he returned documents that
belonged to the firm.9 6
Sullivan & Cromwell moved for a preliminary injunction, and
Charney moved to dismiss claims brought by Sullivan &
Cromwell. 97 At oral argument on the motions, Charney agreed to
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. The Sullivan & Cromwell complaint alleged four causes of action: (1) breach
of fiduciary duty based on Chamey's dissemination of privileged and confidential
information in violation of the N.Y. Code of Professional Responsibility, (2) breach of a
confidentiality agreement that Charney signed as a firm employee, (3) conversion of the
firm's confidential material, and (4) replevin. Complaint at 2, 6-8, Sullivan & Cromwell,
LLP v. Charney, 2007 WL 1240437 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 30,2007) (No. 600333/2007).
93. Anthony Lin, Sullivan, Ex-Associate Settle: Confidential Pact Ends Gay Bias Suit,
238 N.Y. L.J. 1 (2007), availableat 10/26/2007 N.Y. L.J. 1, (col. 4) (Westlaw).
94. Charney, 2007 WL 1240437, at *3.
95. Bruce Jackson & Debra G. Buster, Charney v. Sullivan & Cromwell: What
Lessons Lie for Your Firm?, LAW J. NEWSLS., Nov. 2007, http://www.agg.com/
media/interior/publications/charney-pub short.pdf.
96. William Jordan, Law Firm May Not Bring Breach of Fiduciary Duty Claim
Against Associate for Disclosing Confidential Information, 32 PROF. LIAB. REP. 10 256,
256-57 (2007).
97. Sullivan & Cromwell (S & C) moved for a preliminary injunction enjoining
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a preliminary injunction. Therefore, the court's opinion focuses on
Charney's motion to dismiss.
The court agreed with Charney on the issue of whether a firm
may bring a breach of fiduciary duty claim against an at-will
employee based on an alleged violation of New York disciplinary
rules or an alleged disclosure of confidential or proprietary
documents and information. 98 Because New York law does not
allow clients to recover damages for violations of disciplinary
rules, the court reasoned that the firm should not be able to do
The court also noted the general rule in New York that an
SO. 9
employee does not owe a fiduciary duty to an employer. 0 0 The
court declined to make an exception to the rule for associates who
violate their ethical obligations to clients and act disloyally to their
firms by saying embarrassing things and disclosing confidential
information to the media."' Within six months of this opinion,
the firm announced that it had reached a settlement with
Charney.20 Had the lawsuit not settled, it is unclear whether a
higher court would have concurred with the lower court's
conclusion that the firm could not recover damages for breach of
fiduciary duty.
The litigation between Charney and Sullivan & Cromwell
illustrates how electronic communications and website postings
Charney from:
(1) revealing or disclosing the confidences or secrets of S & C's clients; (2) revealing
or disclosing materials in any form constituting S & C's attorney work product or
proprietary non-public information of S & C; (3) directing Charney to return all
documents, files, and other materials in any form referring or relating to S & C's
clients, S & C attorney work product, proprietary non-public information, and the
tapes referred to in paragraph two of the complaint he filed.
Charney, 2007 WL 1240437, at *1. Charney cross-moved to dismiss S & C's complaint,
"arguing that S & C's claims [were] flatly contradicted by documentary evidence, [were]
legally insufficient, or [had] been rendered moot by both voluntary action on his part and
interim court orders." Id.
98. Id. at *5-6. Various considerations may have influenced the court, including the
fact that much of the client information was not actually confidential and that Charney
had returned various material to the law firm. Id. at *4, *5 n.5.
99. Id. at *5. The court noted there is little compelling reason to extend to a law firm
a private cause of action for violation of a disciplinary rule when clients themselves have
no such right. Charney, 2007 WL 1240437, at *5.
100. Id.
101. Id. at *5-6.
102. Anthony Lin, Sullivan, Ex-Associate Settle: Confidential Pact Ends Gay Bias
Suit, 238 N.Y. L.J. 1 (2007), availableat 10/26/2007 N.Y.L.J. 1, (col. 4) (Westlaw).
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may transform an associate from a plaintiff to a defendant.
Recently, Levison Axelrod, a New Jersey-based personal injury
firm, sued a former associate who had created a website criticizing
the firm. 10 3 Alleging unfair competition and breach of loyalty,
Levison Axelrod sought a court order to shut down the website.' ° 4
Lawsuits where associates have faced allegations of breach of
duty for disclosure of firm and client information have apparently
not put much of a damper on the weekly leaks of information to
popular websites, such as ATL, a self-described legal tabloid.
Leaked information commonly relates to information on compensation, layoffs, and job satisfaction. Depending on the circum10 5
stances, it is debatable whether such information is confidential.
Other information related to firm business may be confidential.
Consider an example of a law firm that is investigating whether a
practice leader has been inflating the bills of all lawyers the leader
supervises. To conduct a meaningful audit, the firm's general
counsel determines that it is necessary to review bills with the
associates in the practice group. Assume that an associate, without
authorization, discloses to the media the fact of the internal
investigation, and the disclosure hurts the firm's relationship with
current and prospective clients. In such a situation, did the
associate-agent breach a duty to preserve confidential information
of the firm-principal? Assuming there are damages, does the firm
possess an actionable claim? Should the answer turn on whether
the firm took steps to impress on the associates the sensitive and
confidential nature of the information before the disclosure?
Firms have taken various steps to deter the disclosure of
information considered to be confidential. Common practices
103. Martha Neil, Law Firm & Ex-Associate Litigate Badmouth Blog Battle in State &
Federal Court, A.B.A. J., Nov. 10, 2009, http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/
lawfirmex-associatelitigate-badmouth-blog-battle.
104. Id.

105. Comments posted on a discussion thread on ATL noted that blanket
prohibitions on associates discussing workplace conditions "clearly violated federal law."
Posting of David Lat to Above the Law, Congratulations to WilmerHale on a Major Pro
Bono Win (Plus the WilmerHale Warning, and Thoughts on Law Firms Trying to Crack
Down on Leaks.), http://abovethelaw.com2009/10/congratulations-to-wilmerhale-on-amajor-pro-bono-winplus-the-wilmerhale-warning-and-thoughts-on-aw-firms-trying-to-cra
ck-down-on-leaks (Oct. 30, 2009, 16:14 EST). Another post indicated that a firm
precluding discussion of compensation violated federal law and possibly state and local
equivalents. Id. Query whether the laws would apply to posting information on the
Internet.
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include asking employees to sign confidentiality agreements and
specifically reminding lawyers of the confidential nature of
particular information. 10 6 As indicated by the recent leaks of
information, however, these efforts may not be successful even
when firms take precautions to prevent a document from being
disclosed outside the firm.10 7
Firm leaders who are disheartened by leaks of firm information
may take a different approach. When concerned about the
possible leaks of information, partners may determine that the
safer course of action is to not share information with associates.
Firm leaders may prefer this cone of silence to risking public
discussion of private firm business.10 8 The unintended consequence of this approach is that it undermines the connection of
associates to their firms.
A much different approach to addressing concerns about leaks is
for firm partners to discuss seriously why associates would disclose
information that reflects adversely on their firms. This examination may reveal that associates do not feel committed to their
firms. The following section discusses this organizational dynamic
and how the current economic climate provides an opportunity for
firms to reshape attitudes and firm culture.

106. E.g., Posting of David Lat to Above the Law, Update: Bingham Associate
Given Date Rape Drug? Internal Email Offers Rebuttal to Ex-Associate's Claims, http://
abovethelaw.com/2008/05[bingham-mccutchen-daterape-drug.php (May 8, 2008, 15:55
EST) (on file with the St. Mary's Law Journal)(printing a firm memorandum that outlines
the firm's response to a complaint and asks recipient to maintain the confidentiality of the
information). Another article indicates that law firm leaders abroad are also attempting to
prevent leaks. See Posting of Isaac Smith to Above the Law, Letter from London: U.K.
Confidential, http://abovethelaw.coml2009/031etter-fromlondonl.php (Mar. 16, 2009,
11:07 EST) (reporting that the London managing partner of DLA Piper, LLP pleaded for
ideas on preserving the confidentiality of information on redundancy packages).
107. In an online interview, David Lat, the founder and managing editor of Above
the Law, described an incident in which a firm took steps to prevent an electronic
communication from being printed or distributed. One of the recipients avoided the
controls by taking a photograph of a document on the computer screen, which could then
be forwarded to persons outside the firm. Web chat: Why Openness & Transparency at
Law Firms Matters (Oct. 15, 2009) (recording of live call-in radio show with David Lat,
moderated by Edward A. Adams), http:// www.legalrebels.com/ posts/why-opennesstrans
parency-at law firmsmatters live call-inradio show/.
108. A different strategy involves carefully tailoring communications with an eye
toward possible disclosure outside the firm, although firm leaders may deny that they
"manage to the blogs."
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CONCLUSION-RETHINKING FIRM CULTURE AND
TREATMENT OF ASSOCIATES

A survey of breach of fiduciary claims against associates reveals
that associates may not fully recognize the extent to which they
owe fiduciary duties to their employing firms. Beyond refraining
from serious misconduct, such as fraudulent billing and insider
trading, do the majority of associates recognize that they owe
other duties to their employers? Regular leaks of information to
blogs suggest that many associates are not reluctant to disseminate
information that hurts their employer's image or reputation.
These Internet comments suggest that many associates may not
feel a sense of loyalty when communicating about their employers.
In response to the WilmerHale memo discussed earlier, a
number of comments on ATL referred to the lack of loyalty. The
following represents the general sentiment: "[Partners] don't
understand why associates post anything to ATL-they stupidly
think associates have as much at stake in the firm as they do, yet
they give us no reason to be loyal. Their efforts to develop loyalty
and increase morale are completely misguided." 10 9 This comment
reflects the sentiments of law firm associates who complain about
firm morale and partner treatment. On the other hand, firm
partners may question the maturity and professionalism of
associates. In criticizing the conduct of associates, one senior
lawyer told me, "We created brats (associates), and we should not
be surprised when they act like brats."
A comparison of opinions of associates and partners indicates a
disconnect between partners and associates. Many associates do
not feel committed to their firms and partners do not feel
committed to associates. The lack of commitment and loyalty is a
by-product of the transformation in the economics, structure, and
organization of large law firms. These changes include partners
moving from lock-step compensation to "eat what you kill"
systems. As a result, partners are less inclined to devote time to
firm-wide initiatives, such as mentoring and training of
associates. 110 Another significant change relates to client efforts
109. Posting of David Lat & Elie Mystal to Above the Law, WilmerHale Warns
Associates Against Talking to ATL-But Has It Worked?, http://abovethelaw.com
(Oct. 13,
/2009/10/wilmerhale-warns-associates-against-talking-to-atl-but-has-it-worked?
2009, 17:40 EST).
110. Marc Galanter & William Henderson, The Elastic Tournament: A Second
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to lower their legal budgets. Sophisticated clients do not want to
pay for associates to provide costly services; rather, these clients
carefully manage their legal budgets and ask that routine work be
handled by contract lawyers. 11 '
These shifts have affected
training, mentoring, and development opportunities for
1 12
associates.
Another structural change relates to shifts in lawyer positions in
firms. As discussed in Part I, many firms now include ranks of
permanent and staff lawyers who are not on the partnership
track." 3 While on these tracks, these lawyers have no prospect of
acquiring equity status in their firms. As a result, these associates
may not feel like they have a long-term stake in their firms.
In addition to thousands of lawyers who agree to work as
permanent or staff associates, many associates work in law firms
where the likelihood of making partner is very low. 1 4 Even
associates on the partnership track may not aspire to acquire
Transformation of the Big Law Firm, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1867, 1868 (2008). In an empirical
study I conducted of associates in 1999, 43% of the respondents reported that they agreed
with the following statement: "Because of the pressure on partners to bill and generate
business, partners in my firm do not provide the mentoring and training that I need and
want." Forty-two percent of the respondents disagreed with the statement. Susan Saab
Fortney, Soul for Sale: An Empirical Study of Associate Satisfaction, Law Firm Culture,
and the Effects of Billable Hour Requirements, 69 UMKC L. REV. 239, 283 (2000). For a
discussion of the demise of mentoring and training, see ROBERT W. HILLMAN, HILLMAN
ON LAWYER MOBILITY § 1.5 (2d ed. 1998 & Supp. 2008).
111. Tamara Loomis, Don't Look Back, AM. L., Student Edition, Fall 2009, at 16, 18.
112. Lack of mentoring and training contributes to attrition in firms. Before the
recent economic downturn, associates were voluntarily leaving law firms in droves.
Studies conducted by the National Association of Law Placement (NALP) revealed that
almost one-half of all associates left law firms within three years, and three-quarters left
within five years. Deborah L. Rhode, Foreword: Personal Satisfaction in Professional
Practice,58 SYRACUSE L. REV. 217, 220 (2008) (citing NALP, UPDATE ON ASSOCIATE
ATTRITION 11 (2006)). In a cross-profession study that I conducted for NALP in 2005,
approximately 37% of law firm respondents were interested in changing jobs within two
years. SUSAN SAAB FORTNEY, IN PURSUIT OF ATTORNEY WORK-LIFE BALANCE: BEST
PRACTICES IN MANAGEMENT 28 (2005). When asked to identify the most influential
factor causing respondents to change jobs, the largest percentage of firm lawyers (26.4%)
reported "reduction of work hours" as the most influential factor. Id.
113. For an examination of empirical evidence and implications of the new "elastic"
tournament model based on a core of owner-partners surrounded by a larger mantle of
employed lawyers, see Marc Galanter & William Henderson, The Elastic Tournament: A
Second Transformation of the Big Law Firm, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1867,1871-1907 (2008).
114. Nate Raymond, In FurtherSign of Tough Economy, Law Firms Promote Fewer
Senior Partners to Partnership,242 N.Y. L.J. 1 (2009), available at 11/30/2009 N.Y.L.J. 1,
(col. 3) (Westlaw) (quoting a law firm consultant who explained that firms "may be trying
to avoid dividing their dwindling net income among even more partners").
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equity status. They may perceive work in a large law firm as a way
to pay student loans and obtain experience before moving to other
employment, commonly a general counsel position. 1 5 Because
they may
these lawyers do not want to climb ranks to partnership,
16
firms.
their
to
loyalty
of
sense
a
not feel much of
The economic downturn has aggravated these problems." 7
Clients are cutting amounts expended for legal services. Firms'
profit margins have been squeezed by both sagging demand and
record-high expenses, leading to mass layoffs, salary freezes, salary
cuts, deferred start dates for first-year associates, and canceled or
downsized summer programs. 118 The manner in which some firms
have handled these issues has also damaged morale and
undermined loyalty. For example, a firm may publicly state that it
terminated associates because of poor performance reviews, rather
than because of the lack of work. Such comments not only hurt
the terminated employees but serve as a blow to remaining
associates. 119 Associates are also very troubled to learn that their
colleagues are being terminated because of economic downturn,
but partners are continuing to make millions.
Firm managers who bemoan the lack of loyalty should look in
the mirror and consider what actions they take to build team
115. In the study I conducted for NALP, the largest percentage of respondents who
wanted to change jobs indicated that they were most interested in a corporate counsel
position.

SUSAN SAAB FORTNEY, IN PURSUIT OF ATTORNEY WORK-LIFE BALANCE:

BEST PRACTICES IN MANAGEMENT 28 (2005); Susan Saab Fortney, The Billable Hours
Derby: Empirical Data on the Problems and PressurePoints, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 171,
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culture within their organizations. 1 20

Firms should attempt to

foster a sense of inclusion by treating associates as assets whose
opinions are valued. 1 2 ' Loyalty is a two-way street. As posed by
David Lat, founder of ATL, "When it comes to relationships
between associates and their law firms, who broke the social
compact first?'

1

22

If partners want associates to be loyal, the

partners should treat associates as the future of the firm, not
temporary inhabitants.
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